/** * [ChaCha20](https://cr.yp.to/chacha.html) stream cipher, released * in 2008. Developed after Salsa20, ChaCha aims to increase diffusion per round. * It was standardized in [RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439) and * is now used in TLS 1.3. * * [XChaCha20](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha) * extended-nonce variant is also provided. Similar to XSalsa, it's safe to use with * randomly-generated nonces. * * Check out [PDF](http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) and * [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20). * @module */ import { createCipher, rotl } from './_arx.js'; import { poly1305 } from './_poly1305.js'; import { clean, createView, equalBytes, getOutput, setBigUint64, wrapCipher, } from './utils.js'; /** * ChaCha core function. */ // prettier-ignore function chachaCore(s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds = 20) { let y00 = s[0], y01 = s[1], y02 = s[2], y03 = s[3], // "expa" "nd 3" "2-by" "te k" y04 = k[0], y05 = k[1], y06 = k[2], y07 = k[3], // Key Key Key Key y08 = k[4], y09 = k[5], y10 = k[6], y11 = k[7], // Key Key Key Key y12 = cnt, y13 = n[0], y14 = n[1], y15 = n[2]; // Counter Counter Nonce Nonce // Save state to temporary variables let x00 = y00, x01 = y01, x02 = y02, x03 = y03, x04 = y04, x05 = y05, x06 = y06, x07 = y07, x08 = y08, x09 = y09, x10 = y10, x11 = y11, x12 = y12, x13 = y13, x14 = y14, x15 = y15; for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) { x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 16); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 12); x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 8); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 7); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 16); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 12); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 8); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 7); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 16); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 12); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 8); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 7); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 16); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 12); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 8); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 7); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 16); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 12); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 8); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 7); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 16); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 12); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 8); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 7); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 16); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 12); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 8); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 7); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 16); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 12); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 8); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 7); } // Write output let oi = 0; out[oi++] = (y00 + x00) | 0; out[oi++] = (y01 + x01) | 0; out[oi++] = (y02 + x02) | 0; out[oi++] = (y03 + x03) | 0; out[oi++] = (y04 + x04) | 0; out[oi++] = (y05 + x05) | 0; out[oi++] = (y06 + x06) | 0; out[oi++] = (y07 + x07) | 0; out[oi++] = (y08 + x08) | 0; out[oi++] = (y09 + x09) | 0; out[oi++] = (y10 + x10) | 0; out[oi++] = (y11 + x11) | 0; out[oi++] = (y12 + x12) | 0; out[oi++] = (y13 + x13) | 0; out[oi++] = (y14 + x14) | 0; out[oi++] = (y15 + x15) | 0; } /** * hchacha helper method, used primarily in xchacha, to hash * key and nonce into key' and nonce'. * Same as chachaCore, but there doesn't seem to be a way to move the block * out without 25% performance hit. */ // prettier-ignore export function hchacha(s, k, i, o32) { let x00 = s[0], x01 = s[1], x02 = s[2], x03 = s[3], x04 = k[0], x05 = k[1], x06 = k[2], x07 = k[3], x08 = k[4], x09 = k[5], x10 = k[6], x11 = k[7], x12 = i[0], x13 = i[1], x14 = i[2], x15 = i[3]; for (let r = 0; r < 20; r += 2) { x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 16); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 12); x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 8); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 7); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 16); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 12); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 8); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 7); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 16); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 12); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 8); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 7); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 16); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 12); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 8); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 7); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 16); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 12); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 8); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 7); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 16); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 12); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 8); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 7); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 16); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 12); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 8); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 7); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 16); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 12); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 8); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 7); } let oi = 0; o32[oi++] = x00; o32[oi++] = x01; o32[oi++] = x02; o32[oi++] = x03; o32[oi++] = x12; o32[oi++] = x13; o32[oi++] = x14; o32[oi++] = x15; } /** * Original, non-RFC chacha20 from DJB. 8-byte nonce, 8-byte counter. */ export const chacha20orig = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 8, allowShortKeys: true, }); /** * ChaCha stream cipher. Conforms to RFC 8439 (IETF, TLS). 12-byte nonce, 4-byte counter. * With 12-byte nonce, it's not safe to use fill it with random (CSPRNG), due to collision chance. */ export const chacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, allowShortKeys: false, }); /** * XChaCha eXtended-nonce ChaCha. 24-byte nonce. * With 24-byte nonce, it's safe to use fill it with random (CSPRNG). * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha */ export const xchacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 8, extendNonceFn: hchacha, allowShortKeys: false, }); /** * Reduced 8-round chacha, described in original paper. */ export const chacha8 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, rounds: 8, }); /** * Reduced 12-round chacha, described in original paper. */ export const chacha12 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, rounds: 12, }); const ZEROS16 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(16); // Pad to digest size with zeros const updatePadded = (h, msg) => { h.update(msg); const left = msg.length % 16; if (left) h.update(ZEROS16.subarray(left)); }; const ZEROS32 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32); function computeTag(fn, key, nonce, data, AAD) { const authKey = fn(key, nonce, ZEROS32); const h = poly1305.create(authKey); if (AAD) updatePadded(h, AAD); updatePadded(h, data); const num = new Uint8Array(16); const view = createView(num); setBigUint64(view, 0, BigInt(AAD ? AAD.length : 0), true); setBigUint64(view, 8, BigInt(data.length), true); h.update(num); const res = h.digest(); clean(authKey, num); return res; } /** * AEAD algorithm from RFC 8439. * Salsa20 and chacha (RFC 8439) use poly1305 differently. * We could have composed them similar to: * https://github.com/paulmillr/scure-base/blob/b266c73dde977b1dd7ef40ef7a23cc15aab526b3/index.ts#L250 * But it's hard because of authKey: * In salsa20, authKey changes position in salsa stream. * In chacha, authKey can't be computed inside computeTag, it modifies the counter. */ export const _poly1305_aead = (xorStream) => (key, nonce, AAD) => { const tagLength = 16; return { encrypt(plaintext, output) { const plength = plaintext.length; output = getOutput(plength + tagLength, output, false); output.set(plaintext); const oPlain = output.subarray(0, -tagLength); xorStream(key, nonce, oPlain, oPlain, 1); const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, oPlain, AAD); output.set(tag, plength); // append tag clean(tag); return output; }, decrypt(ciphertext, output) { output = getOutput(ciphertext.length - tagLength, output, false); const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength); const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength); const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, data, AAD); if (!equalBytes(passedTag, tag)) throw new Error('invalid tag'); output.set(ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength)); xorStream(key, nonce, output, output, 1); // start stream with i=1 clean(tag); return output; }, }; }; /** * ChaCha20-Poly1305 from RFC 8439. * * Unsafe to use random nonces under the same key, due to collision chance. * Prefer XChaCha instead. */ export const chacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16 }, _poly1305_aead(chacha20)); /** * XChaCha20-Poly1305 extended-nonce chacha. * * Can be safely used with random nonces (CSPRNG). * See [IRTF draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha). */ export const xchacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 24, tagLength: 16 }, _poly1305_aead(xchacha20)); //# sourceMappingURL=chacha.js.map